I finally found an excuse to link to an awesome blog that I’ve been reading avidly since I found out about it a few months ago. From an Anthropological Perspective, Dr. Marcus Griffin’s blog about his experiences as an embedded anthropologist under the “Human Terrain System“.
I talked about the importance of functioning infrastructure in a recent post. Dr. Griffin talks about it too, in a slightly different way.
I am tentatively thinking that a lack of communal social space is likely a hardship for urban Iraqis. The poorer neighborhoods that have closely spaced housing compounds and no courtyards may be experiencing greater anomie because the rubble and debris on top of and around their dwellings compound their lack of communal space.
I find this fascinating. We don’t often think about the psychic weight that a lack of community can cause, but how can people build a government when they can’t talk on the street, when they’re afraid to leave their house?
Trash may be removed from primary streets but that does not alleviate the social anxiety caused lack of functional space for group interaction within their own living areas. Bulk removal operations should be seriously considered to create usable social space denied residents as a result of kinetic operations.
Another unexpected consequence of our actions- every time we blow up a house, we create rubble, rubble that clogs up roads and makes travel and socializing difficult. When the trash sits around forever, it doesn’t exactly engender trust or faith in the government. Foreign Policy’s awesome feature “Seven Questions” talked to Toby Dodge a few days ago and the infrastructure question came up.
FP: Unless it can actually get into neighborhoods and provide necessary services, is there a future for the Iraqi government?
TD: I don’t think so. The fundamental cause of all these problems is the collapse of the Iraqi state. I was living in Baghdad in April 2003, and it was amazing to watch the institutions of the state disappear. You would see men running out [of buildings] with computers, then desks and chairs, then the plumbing and electrical wiring out of the walls. The state was dissembled, taken away, and put in people’s houses. And what the looters didn’t do, [Coalition Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul] Bremer’s de-Baathification did. It broke the institutional memory of the state.
On that basis, we don’t have a failing state or a collapsed state—we simply don’t have a state.
Both articles are worth a read and talk about other important issues. Consider yourself urged to check them out- and subscribe to Dr. Griffin’s blog!
Trackposted at Diary of the Mad Pigeon
When terrorists and insurgents in Iraq started using chlorine as a weapon, they probably didn’t anticipate the full consequences of their actions. Unfortunately, neither did we.
Our response to the attacks was to make it difficult to import chlorine, and considering that the bad guys weren’t just using chlorine bombs but weaponizing friendly chlorine transport trucks, I can kind of understand where we were coming from. Denying the insurgents use of the gas is expedient and much easier than the alternative of guarding every shipment of chlorine 24/7.
The problem is that chlorine is an essential part of urban infrastructure, used to clean water and make it drinkable. In a country that already has problems with infrastructure due to our invasion, the continued insurgency, and general economic decline, a lack of cleanliness is the last thing they need.
Case in point: cholera has broken out nationwide. The BBC puts current dead at 12, with one in Baghdad. Once something like this hits a city, it’ll take some doing to make sure it doesn’t hit critical mass and become an epidemic
Eric Umansky has a lot more information than even the BBC report at this point. He’s also got the money quote, the “so what” for military folks trying to learn a lesson from the ups and downs of our security campaign in Iraq.
In other words, the biggest damage from chlorine bombs–as with so many terrorist attacks–has come from overreaction to it. Fear operates as a “force multiplier” for terrorists and in this case has helped them cut off Iraq’s clean water.
That’s right, Mr. Umansky. Even though some people (justly, in certain circumstances) criticize our “War on Abstract Nouns,” the phrase “War on Terror” is helpful when we consider the circumstances. We are fighting people who take as the core of their tactics creating fear in the hearts of their opponents. We must be careful we do not assist them by falling prey to it.
Via Schneier.
If you’re interested in logistics and the effect it can have on a war or our emergency preparations, check out Jonathan Soroko’s Popular Logistics.
Earlier I mentioned the walls that were being built in Baghdad and how they were probably a bad idea. Courtesy of my Geospatial Analysis professor (sometimes being a student is great), I was turned on to this map. While all the information on it is interesting, take a look at the difference between the ethnic boundaries pre-2006 and “current” (as of February 2007).
Of course it’s a few months out of date, but look at how sectarian Baghdad has gotten compared to what it used to be. Look also at how little red dots blossom as you drag the time slider from the left to the right.
If you’re looking for other cool maps, here’s a few sites to check out:
Strange Maps, a blog which posts all sorts of strange, wonderful and amusing maps from all sorts of different sources. Sometimes educational, always a hoot.
Global Incident Map, brought to me by way of Diary of the Mad Pigeon. Updates continuously with terrorism attacks and “suspicious events” from around the world. Fascinating, eye-opening, and scary.
Forgive me if ghetto-izing (literally!) Iraq doesn’t sound like the best idea. Look at the security barriers in Israel. Look at the Berlin Wall. While they might have decreased numbers initially, they are undeniably oppressive. They created fear and misery and poverty, and were a physical manifestation of the separateness that was causing the problem in the first place.
Isn’t factionalism, isn’t tribalism the very root of many of the problems we see in Baghdad today? Why build a wall that heightens the sense of difference?
A spokesman says the security plan doesn’t call for “these… small gated communities.” I wholeheartedly appreciate that- but where does that leave the other two supposedly being planned, as the BBC reports?
There’s got to be a better way. Of course, I can’t think of one off the top of my head, but I’ll be putting some thought into it over the coming days. Do you have any ideas?
P.S.> If you’re interested in walls and the effect they have on populations, take a look at the way-over-my-head-but-interesting blog, Subtopia.
Trackposted to Diary of the Mad Pigeon
DANGER ROOM yet again.
New York Times reports that LTGEN Raymond Odierno recommends ’surge’ troop levels (meaning the deployment of five more brigades, only two of which have been rolled out thus far) be sustained until at least early 2008.
Remember, this isn’t anything official since the surge is currently slated to drop this August and many congresspeople aren’t too happy about even that. The chances of them approving an extension look slim right now.
But who knows what could change between now and August?